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UNITED STATES Cert to CA9 (Fletcher, Poole, Canby) 
v. 
DANN and DANN Federal/Civil Timely 
SUMMARY: The Indian Claims Commission entered a final judgment 
awarding the Western Shoshone Identifiable Group of Indians in excess 
of $26 million as damages for the extinguishment of their aboriginal 
title to over 24 million acres in Nevada and California. Section 
22(a) of the 1946 Indian Claims Commission Act provides that upon 
"payment of any claim" adjudicated by the Commisssion, the United 
States receives a "full discharge" of "all claims and demands touching --any of the matters involved in the controversy." Funds to pay the 
'• 
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judgment were appropriated, and a treasury account was established for 
the benefit of the Western Shoshones. However, the proceeds have not 
yet been distributed to individual Indians or committed to any other 
designated tribal purpose. The question is whether, under these 
circumstances, the Western Shoshone remin free to assert, in 
collateral litigation, that aboriginal title to lands covered by the 
Claims Commission award has never been extinguished. 
FACTS AND DECISION BELOW: The United States commenced this 
t~es.p~ action in 1974 by alleging in the DC that resps were grazing .......___ __ _ 
livestock on 8 sections of federal public lands in Nevada without a 
grazing permit from the Bureau of Land Management (BLM). The .__ ___ ___,., 
government sought damages and an injunction barring resps from grazing 
their animals without a BLM grazing permit. Resps answered by 
asserting that BLM lacked authority to administer the lands because 
the lands were beneficially owned by resps and other members of the 
Western Shoshone Tribe. 
The lands occuped by resps are a small part of an area that was 
I the subject of proceedings before the Indian Claims Commission at the time that the government's complaint in this trespass action was 
filed. In the Claims Commission proceedings, originally filed in 
1951, various Shoshone tribal groups sought, through representative 
parties, to recover damages for the loss of aboriginal title that they 
claimed to have possessed to lands located in Nevada, California, and 
several other states. The Commission decided to consider the claims 
of the constituent bands of the larger Shoshone Nation individually. 
It found that the Western Shoshone constituted a se arate identifiable 
group for the purpose of presenting a claim against the United States. 
It also found that the Temoak Band of Shoshone Indians was a proper 
representative of the Western Shoshone Identifiable group. The Temoak 
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Band was thus authorized to maintain, on behalf of the entire group, a 
'f claim for damages for the extinguishment of aboriginal title to 22 
million acres in Nevada and 2 million adjoining acres in California. 
In 1962 the Claims Commission entered an interlocutory order 
finding that the Western Shoshones had held aboriginal title to the 24 
million acres of land in issue. With respect to the bulk of the 
lands, in Nevada, the Commission found that aboriginal title had been 
extinguished over a period of years through encroachment by settlers 
and others and the acquisition or taking of lands by the United 
States. In order to avoid complex litigation as to the extinguishment 
date for separate parcels, the parties stipulated to, and the 
Commission approved, an average extinguishment date of July 1, 1872, 
to serve as the valuation date for determining compensation due for 
the Nevada lands. Following a trial, the Commission determined the 
fair market value of the Nevada lands to have been $21,350,000. 
Subsequently, in April 1974, while the parties were awaiting 
rulings by the Commission on issues that had to be resolved prior to 
entry of a final judgement, the Western Shoshone Legal Defense and 
Education Ass'n, with which resps were associated, sought to intervene 
in the claims proceedings. The intervenor sought to amend the claim 
to delete the request for an award covering certain acres including 
the lands at issue in this case, as to which it asserted that 
aboriginal title remained unextinguished, and sought a stay of the 
claims proceedings pending a decision in this case, which had by then 
been filed in the DC. The Commission denied the motion to intervene. 
Before further action could occur in the claims proceedings, the 
~ in 1977 entered summary judgment in favor of petr in the instant 
l trespass action. The DC held that resps' assertion that aboriginal 
title to the lands they occupied remained unextinguished was barred by 
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the collateral estoppel effect of the Commission's 1962 ruling that 
the United States had extinguished the aboriginal title of the Western 
Shoshones to their former lands in Nevada. 
The CA9 reversed (Dann I). It held that claim preclusion had no 
application because the Commission's ruling was interlocutory. It 
also observed that the statutory finality provision of the Indian 
Claims Commission Act, §22(a), did not become operative until final 
judgment was entered and payment made. The CA also held that 
collateral estoppel could in no event be applied to the extinguishment 
question, asserting that "the extinguishment question was not 
necessarily in issue, it was not actually litigated and it has not 
been decided." 
Meanwhile, events had again moved forward in the Commission 
proceedings. In Nov. 1976 the Temoak Band reversed its position and 
moved the Commission to stay all proceedings pending a determination 
that they still retained aboriginal title to their former territory in 
Nevada. In 1977 the Commission denied the motion for a stay and 
entered final judgment, awarding the Western Shoshones in excess of 
$26 million. The Court of Claims affirmed. Temoak Band of Western 
Shoshones v. United States, 593 F.2d 994 (Ct. Cl.), cert. denied, 444 
u.s. 973 (1979). It emphasized the tardiness of the stay application 
and noted that Congress had amended the standing appropriation 
covering Court of Claims judgments so as to extend its coverage to 
Indian Claims judgments. See 31 u.s.c. §724a. Because of this 
amendment, it no longer remained possible for the Western Shoshones to 
forestall operation of the preclusion provision, §22(a) of the Indian 
Claims Commission Act, simply by persuading Congress to defer an 
appropriation. The court stated that the Shoshones' true appeal is 
"to legislative grace, not as of right to this court." The court's 
/ 
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final award was certified to the General Accoul1ting Office for 
payment. Pursuant to the amended 31 1 u.s.c. §724a, supra, the award 
was automatically appropriated and deposited in a trust account for 
the Western Shoshones. 
In 1980, the DC entered final judgment in the trespass case 
against resps. It held that the judgment of the Commission had become 
final and that upon certification of the Commission award, the award 
was "automatically paid" and therefore final for purposes of res 
~L. 
judicata and collateral estoppel. It further held that the effect of 
the award was to extinguish aboriginal title to these Western Shoshone 
'----·- ______.. ' 
lands as of the date when the award was certified to the General 
Accounting Office, and that before that date title had not been 
extinguished. The DC issued an injunction against further trespasses 
by resps, but denied damages for previous trespasses, which had 
preceded the certification of the claims award. Both sides appealed. 
ThevEA9 reversed the judgment granting the injunction. Adhering 
to its ruling in Dann I, the CA held that collateral estoppel was 
inapplicalbe to the extinguishment issue, describing that issue as one 
not actually litigated in the claims proceeding. It also declined to 
apply res judicata, reasoning that §22(a) of the Indian Claims 
Commission Act was intended to ~xhausti~ set for~the entire bar 
effect of a favorable claim determination and thus to · supplant the 
judge-made preclusion doctrine. The court then found the statutory 
bar of §22 a --·-- inapplicable. This last ruling is the one challenged 
The CA ackowledged that the award had been automatically 
appropriated and had been credited to an interest-bearing Treasury 
account in the name of Western Shoshone. But because the funds had 
not been distributed to individual Western Shoshone, or applied to 
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collective tribal purposes pursuant to the D~stribution of Judgment 
Funds Act, 25 u.s.c. §1401, the court concluded that the Western 
Shoshones' claim had not been paid for purposes of the statutory 
preclusion provision. Section 22(a) of the 1946 Indian Claims 
Commission Act provides that upon "payment of any claim" adjudicated 
by the Commisssion, the United States receives a "full discharge" of 
"all claims and demands touching any of the matters involved in the 
controversy." The ordinary meaning of "payment" does not comprehend a 
"transfer of funds that leaves such significant blocks in the way of 
delivery to the payee." The court recognized that in 1976 Congress 
had changed its appropriation process to make appropriations automatic 
after certification to the General Accounting Office of a final 
judgment by the Commission, but concluded that Congress must have 
intended t~t" b~ of §22 not to go into effect until a plan 
--------of distribution of the judgment funds had been approved by Congress. ------- ~ ~~---------
~ CONTENTIONS: The SG argues that the CA's interpretation of 
§22(a) is "plainly erroneous." The view that §22(a) should be 
interpreted to preserve for Congress the opportunity to take a final 
look at the merits of a claim underlying an Indian Claims Commission 
judgment for which funds have been appropriated and paid, in trust, 
into an interest-bearing Treasury account, is contrary to the purposes 
of the Indian Claims Commission Act. The purpose of that Act was to 
divest Congress of responsibility for deciding the merits of Indian 
claims. Congress deliberately rejected suggestions that it retain for 
itself plenary authority to review the claims, and adopted instead the 
language of §22(a) which treats the decision of the Commission "as a 
final judgment of the Court of Claims" payable subject only to the 
formality of the appropriations process. It is also unsupported by 




Funds Act or the amendment by which Congress made a standing 
appropriation applicable to final judgments of the Commission. The 
new procedure was intended to be a more efficient means of determining 
which individual Indians were to receive a share of the tribal trust 
fund and to relieve Congress of the burden of primary responsibility 
of devising distribution plans. The Distribution of Judgment Funds 
Act was intended to create less work for Congress, not more. 
The SG contends that the decision below conflicts with Temoak 
Band of Western Shoshones v. United States, 593 F.2d 994 (Ct. Cl.), 
cert. denied, 444 U.S. 973 (1979), where the court recognized that, in 
light of the application of standing appropriations for Indian Claims 
judgments, "Congress can no longer stop the payment and defer the 
extinguishment of the title claim, just by not appropriating," and 
that the Western Shoshones that seek land in liew of a money judgment 
must now "appeal to legislative grace" if they wish to achieve 
~ that result. The SG also argues that the CA decision could have a 
substantial adverse impact upon federal land administration and land 
titles. While the present action was brought to enjoin an alleged 
grazing trespass on 5,240 acres of federal grazing lands, the panel's 
reasoning could easily be extended to encompass much of the 22 million 
acres in Nevada that were subject to the Indian Claims Commission 
litigation. 
Jl.., '~ 
Resps emphasize tQe narrow issue upon whiclLXbe SG~~view: 
whether the Western Shoshone Identifiable Group, an as yet undefined 
group of individuals, has been "paid". The Indian Claims Commission 
Act, 25 u.s.c. §70u, makes clear that "appropriation of funds for 
payment" and "payment" are two separate events. The petn ignores a 
specific statute defining "payments in satisfaction of [Indian] 
judgments," 25 u.s.c. §118, which provides: 
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"Payments to Indians made from moneys appropriated by Congress in 
satisfaction of the judgment of any court shall be made under the 
direction of the officers of the Interior Department charged by 
law with the supervision of Indian affairs, and all such payments 
shall be accounted for to the Treasury in conformity with law." 
Thus it is clear that "payment" is to be made to Indians .Qy Interior, \~ 
not to Interior as the government contends. 
Moreover, the Distribution of Judgment Funds Act does not 
accomplish "automatic payment" as the SG contends. While the Act made 
it possible for Interior to accomplish payment without further action 
of Congress, the Indian beneficiaries had two ways of delaying or 
stopping the process. First, 25 u.s.c. §1405 provided for a veto of 
the proposed plan for distribution by a resolution of either House of 
Congress. Second, if Interior fails to submit the distribution plan 
to Congress within the time prescribed, and does not get an extension 
of the time period, the Dept must then get legislation authorizing the 
distribution of the funds appropriated for satisfaction of the 
judgment just as if a resolution disapproving the plan had been 
passed. In this very case, Interior failed to formulate a distribution 
plan within the prescribed time. An extention of time was sought but 
denied by the Senate Select Committee on Indian Affairs. Among the 
reasons given by Sen. Mehcher for requiring legislation were that "a 
significant number of Western Shoshone people oppose acceptance of the 
award" and that this suit was then pending. 
Resps also contend that there is no conflict with Western 
Shoshone Legal Defense & Education Fund, supra. In affirming the 
Commission's refusal to grant the would-be intervenors the opportunity 
to prove their contentions that a portion of the lands included in the 
Western Shoshone claim had not been "taken", the Court of Claims 
conceded that the issue was an "open one which could be decided either 
way," but declined to allow the matter to be litigated in the 
- ~ -
Commission by the intervenors. 
.., 
The court then addressed the would-be 
intervenors' fears that payment of the claim would foreclose the 
resolution of the issue by stating that the intervenors could "ask 
Congress to delay making the appropriation and direction which will be 
necessary to pay the award." {emphasis added). The SG quotes a later 
observation out of context. The Court of Claims was merely observing 
that stopping payment could no longer be accomplished at the 
appropriation stage, but the court at no time suggests that the 
amendment of the standing appropriation act makes it impossible to 
stop the payment. 
Finally, resps note that the decision below is interlocutory and 
may be mooted on remand. The CA has given the government the 
opportunity to prove on remand that the Western Shoshone Nation has 
failed to preserve title up to the time of trial and stated that 
( legislation approving a distribution plan would result in "payment" 
within the meaning of the discharge provision. Resps also note that 
the petn fails to point to any case where the question presented is 
actually involved in litigation and state that they are aware of no 
such case. Finally, resps note that the peculiar procedural history 
and unique fact situation makes this an inappropriate case for review. 
They argue that the government has been deceitful in this litigation 
and that a contrary decision violates their right to procedural due 
process. 
An ~icus brief filed by Western Shoshone National Council 
stresses that review is unnecessary because Congress will legislate as 
to distribution of the judgment fund. Interior did not submit a plan 
for the distribution of the judgment fund on time or obtain an 
extension of time to submit the plan. Legislation, which is therefore 
required, will moot the payment issue. The brief also argues that the 
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statute is obsolete. Most of the 600 claims flled with the Commission 
were dismissed or awarded by the time the Commission went out of 
existence in 1978. Section 22 no longer appears in the current West 
edition of United States Code. 
DISCUSSION: As the CA recognized, the question in this case is a 
"close one," though it is hard to agree with the SG that the decision 
..... .......--
~-----~------------------------
below was "plainly erroneous." Section 22(a) in pertinent part 
provides: 
"When the report of the Commission ••• has been filed with 
Congress, such report shall have the effect of a final judgment 
of the Court of Claims, and there is authorized to be 
appropriated such sums as are necessary to pay the final 
determination of the Commission. 
The payment of the claim •.• shall be a full discharge of 
the United States of all claims and demands touching any of the 
matters involved in the controversy." 
The government's premise is that appropriation of the funds is 
-=--=-~--
"payment" for purposes of the second paragraph of the quoted passage. 
The first paragraph implies, however, that appropriation of funds is 
merely one step in the payment process. Moreover, as resps point out, 
25 u.s.c. §118 indicates that a "payment" is to be made to Indians .£y_ 
Interior, not to Interior as the government contends. The payments to 
Interior here would not appear to satisfy that statute. 
\ \ 
There is clearly is J~o direct conflict with Temoak Band, which 
held only that the claims proceedings ought not to be stayed to allow 
for the collateral determination whether a portion of the lands in the 
Western Shoshone claim had not been taken. The court noted that 
Congress can no longer stop a payment simply by not appropriating, but 
the court did not state that payment was therefore automatic. In fact 
the court indicated that Congress could still defer the extinguishment 





dicta on which the SG relies to argue 
hardly, in my view,~n~nsistent with 
A, 
Finally, it is unclear that this 
that a .conflict exists is 
the decision below. 
issue is as important as the SG 
-----------------------~ 
would have us believe. The one issue is whether the Indians were 
---~--·--- -·-----
"paid" for their land when money has been appropriated but not 
distributed to them. If, as the SG contends, "payment" is generally 
automatic, this issue will rarely arise. Absent any confict with the 
decision below, any indication that this Court's review will have 
prospective value, or a stronger argument on the merits by the SG, I 
recommend denial. 
There is a response and an amicus brief. 
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DANN GINA-POW 
83-1476 United States v. Dann 
MEMO TO FILE 
This is a complicated Indian case involving the 
question whether the Aboriginal title of Indians to tribal 
land was extinguished by an award of the Indian Claims 
Commission. A brief but incomplete summary of this case -
in litigation since 1951 is stated as the "question 
presented" in the amicus brief filed by the Western 
Shoshone National Council - a brief in support of Mary and 
Carrie Dann. This reads as follows: 
"In 1951, the Temoak Bands filed a petition 
before the Indian Claims Commission (Docket 326-
K) seeking compensation for the extinguishment 
of title to Western Shoshone lands. Mary and 
Carrie Dann consistently opposed Docket 326-K as 
a threat to their right to occupy ancestral 
Western Shoshone lands. The Court of Claims 
denied motions to delte such lands from Docket 
326-K or to stay the proceedings until title 
could be determined. Final judgment was 
rendered on December 6, 1979. Funds to pay the 
judgment were appropriated, and a treasury 
account was established in the name of the 
Temoak Bands. 
In 1974, the United States sued to enJOin 
the Danns from using lands continuously occupied 
by the Dann Band from time immemorial. The 
Danns answered that Western Shoshone title 
remains unextinguished. The district court held 
that, while the Indian title had never been 
previously extinguished, the Docket 326-K 
judgment itself extinguished title. The Court 
of Appeals reversed, holding that the mere 
appropriation of funds does not constitute 
"payment" under Indian Claims Commission Act 
Section 22 {a) which would foreclose the Danns' 
occupancy of Western Shoshone ancestral lands. 
Under these circumstances, does the mere 
appropriation of funds in response to a judgment 
enable the United States to invoke the discharge 
provision of Section 22 {a) to eject Mary and 
Carrie Dann from otherwise unextinguished 
Western Shoshone title lands? 
The Temoak Bands were found to be representative of 
the Western Shoshone component of the Shoshone Tribe. The 
Danns claimed that they were members of a small band 
called the Dann Band, and were not represented by the 
Temoak Bands. But, under my understanding of the case, no 
one now seriously questions that the Temoak Bands are 
"representative" - in what in effect is a class action -
of all of the Western Shoshone Indians. 
Rather, the specific question before CA9, and now 
before us, seems to be as the SG puts it: 
"The question presented is whether the 
Western Shoshone [Indians] remain free to 
assert, in a collateral litigation, that the 
Aboriginal title to lands covered by the Claims 
Commission Award [of $26 million dollars] has 
never been extinguished." 
It is undisputed that the award of $26 million by the 
Indian Claims Commission was approved by the Court of 
Claims. 
of the 
The parties debate whether, under Section 22(a) 
Claims Commission Act, the appropriation by 
Congress of the amount of the award constitutes "payment", 
and therefore a "full discharge" of "all claims and 
demands touching any of the matters involved in the 
controversey." The Court of Appeals, reversing the DC, 
held - in a fairly persuasively written opinion - that the 
language of Section 22 (a) and other relevant statutory 
provisions make clear that mere appropriation does not 
constitute "payment". In this connection, it is conceded 
that no funds actually have been paid either to the Temoak 
Bands or to any of the individual Indians. The Danns, for 
example, claim that they have been grazing their herds on 
the lands presently in question since time immemorial. 
CA9 decided that final payment will not occur until 
Congress specifies exactly how it is to be made and to 
whom. The SG argues that under the language of 22(a), and 
as shown by its legislative history, appropriation of the 
funds constitutes a "full discharge" of all claims to 
title. 
* * * 
I regret that I voted to grant this case, as I 
certainly did not understand it then. Nor, indeed, am I 
entirely sure I understand it now. The narrow issue 
before us seems a bit insubstantial, as the $26 million 
dollars will be paid. Apparently no one argues in this 
case that if and when the award is paid, title to the 
lands in question will belong to the federal government or 
to homesteaders who lawfully occupied the land. 
I therefore am inclined to DIG this case, and leave 
it up to Congress to settle. This is urged by the brief 
on behalf of the Western Shoshone National Council: 
"There is no doubt that Congress, in the 
exercise of its broad powers to leg is late with 
respect to Indian property and affairs, plans to 
legislate a resolution of the Western Shoshone 
land issues, and can tailor a solution to best 
meet the needs of all affected parties." P. 57 
* * * 
I would like for my clerk to address particularly 
whether Congress is the appropriate body to resolve this 
case. We could affirm CA9 simply by deciding that 
"payment" was not made by the appropriation of the amount 
of the judgment. Although the Danns argue rather 
appealingly that they never should have been represented 
by the Temoak Bands, and that therefore the judgment is 
not binding on them, this issue seems to have been decided 
against the Danns and is not a question presented to us. 
Thus, when payment is made - as it surely will be - the 
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The Indian Claims Commission ["ICC"] was established in 1946 
to investigate and determine the merits of Indian tribal claims 
against the United States and to award damages for meritorious 
claims. s. Rep. 1715, 79th Cong., 2d Sess (1946). In 1951 the 
Temoak Band of the western Shoshone filed a petition before the 
ICC seeking compensation for the extinguishment of title to 
Western Shoshone lands. The ICC found the Wester~Shoshone to be 
an "identifiable group" for purposes of its jurisdiction and held 
the Temoak Band to be a proper representative. The Commission 
thus authorized the Temoak to maintain a claim for damages for 
extinguishment of aboriginal title to 24 million acres in Nevada 
and California previously held by the Western Shoshone. 
Over many years of litigation, the ICC eventually found 
that aboriginal title to the California land was extinguished in 
1853. With respect to the rest of land, the Commission did not 
pinpoint a date on which title was extinguished. The parties 
stipulated, however, that 1872 should be used as the date for 
valuation purposes, and the Commission accepted this stipulation. 
In 1967, the Commission held a trial on the question of the fair 
market value of the lands for which aboriginal title had been 
extinguished. The 
million. I] 'A';_ inal 
---c--r-:-~ J\ 
according to the 
remained unsettled. 
ICC determined the fair market value to be $21 
judgment was not entered, however, because, -




In 1974, the United States filed this suit against the ~ 
Danns, alleging that they were grazing their cattle in violation -
of the Taylor Grazing Act and regulations enacted pursuant to it. 
The Danns defended on the ground that they were Western Shoshone 
Indians and retained their aboriginal title to the land in 
question. The Government countered that any title of the Western 




the ICC on the Identifiable Group's petition for damages. The DC 
granted summary judgment for the United States on the ground that 
the defendants were collaterally 
aboriginal title as a defense. 
·v 
estopped from asserting 
On appeal, CA9 reversed. United States v. Dann, 572 F.2d 
222 (CA9 1978) (Dann I) • The court of appeals held that the 
Danns were not collaterally estopped from asserting 
unextinguished title on two grounds: first, that the question 
whether the Indians' title had been extinguished was neither 
litigated nor decided in the Commission's proceedings; second, 
that the decision of the ICC on which the Government relied was 
J 
not a final judgment within the meaning of the Indian Claims ~ /-
Commission Act because the judgment had not yet been paid. Thus,~· 
CA9 remanded the case to the DC "for the purpose of deciding ~-
 
title." Id. at 223. ~~ 
In the meantime, in 1974, a group calling itself the Western 
Shoshone Legal Defense and Education Association attempted to 
intervene in the ICC proceedings. The Danns were apparently 
members of this group. The Association claimed that some of its 
members still held title to some of the land covered by the 
Identifiable Group's claims. The ICC denied the motion to 
intervene, holding that the question whether title had been 
extinguished had already been settled. The ICC also rejected the 
Association's claim that the Temoaks were not proper 
representatives of their interest because they "colluded" with 
the Government in an attempt to dispossess the Association 
members of their land. On appeal the Court of Claims affirmed 
.> 
these rulings. In the Court of Claims' view, the Association's 
attempt to intervene simply involved a dispute about litigation 
strategy. Western Shoshone Legal Defense & Education Association 
v. United States, 531 F. 2d 495 (Ct. Cl.) , cert. denied, 429 
u.s. 885 (1976) 0 
Two years later, the Temoak Band, which had brought the 
original petition to the ICC, sought to stay the ICC proceedings 
to seek an administrative declaration that the Western Shoshones 
still held aboriginal title to the lands in question. The ICC 
denied its motion, and entered a final judgment awarding the ~­
Identifiable Group over $26 million. This judgment was affirmed u.1 
- V,:' ~ ...__ /C c_ 
by the Court of Claims, which told the Temoaks that it should ask , 
Congress to stay ~s judgment if it wished to pursue its claim to~~ 
title further. Temoak Band of Western Shoshone Indians v. United Cf-~ 
States, 593 F.2d 994, 999 (Ct. Cl.), cert. denied, 444 u.s. 973 
(1979). In 1979, the Clerk of the Court of Claims certified the 
award to the General Accounting Office. 
The DC then rendered its decision on the remand from Dann I. 
The DC held that upon the certification of the ICC award, Indian 
title to land at issue in the ICC proceedings was extinguished. 
The court also held that prior to such cerfication, title had not 
been extinguished. Accordingly, the court issued an injunction 
against further trespasses by the Danns, but denied damages for 
uses of the land which preceded the certification. The parties 
,_/ 
cross-appealed, and CA9 again found in favor of the Danns. ~){f ~~ 
Writing for a unanimous panel, Judge Canby first reaf~~~ 
the holding of Dann I that the extinguishment of the Danns' title 
had not been litigated in the ICC proceedings and therefore that 
the Danns were not collaterally estopped from from raising it as 
C:.4-t11 
a defense. The cour~ next rejected the Government's contention 
that the ICC award operated by way of merger or bar to preclude 
the entire title claim of the Danns. The court relied on §22 of § 2.'2.. 
II I,.\ &2. L, 11 
the ICC Act, which provides that "[t]he payment of any claim,A.r--' 
~
after its determination in accordance with this chapter, shall be 
a full discharge of the United States of all claims and demands 
touching any of the matters involved in this controversy." 25 
u.s.c. §70u. The court held that §22 was the exclusive bar in 
such cases; the common law bar of res judicata did not apply. 
C'/1-1 
The court then considered whether payment has been made 
within the meaning of the Act. CA9 recognized that upon 
certification by the Court of Claims to the General Accounting 
Office, the GAO automatically appropriated the amount of the 
ICC's award pursuant to 31 u.s.c. §724(a) and that the Treasury 
thus held these funds for the benefit of the Indians. 
Nevertheless, the court concluded that such appropriation does 
not constitute payment within the meaning of §22. It reasoned 
that "no monies have actually passed into the hands of the 
Western Shoshone group or its members, nor have any been used for 
their benefit." Distribution of funds can only occur pursuant to 
a plan of use or distribution prepared by the Secretary of the 
Interior and acquiesced in by Congress, or by separate -
legislation. Since no timely plan was submitted to Congress, the ~~f 
----court noted that separate legislation would be required. Thus, 
given the "significant control" of the funds retained by 
Congress, the court concluded that payment had not occurred 
within the meaning of the statute. 
Finally, the ~~t addressed the DC's finding that prior to 
the ICC's judgment and award, aboriginal title had not been 
extinguished. The Government raised three grounds for finding 
that title had been extinguished: (1) application of the 
homestead laws to lands held by the Western Shoshone; ( 2) the 
creation of the Duck Valley Reservation fo~ the Western Shoshone; 
...r-
and (3) administration of the lands under the Taftor Grazing Act. 
Citing this Court's decision in United States v. Santa Fe Pacific 
R.R., 314 u.s. 339 (1941) that extinguishment of Indian title 
requires clear intent, CA9 rejected each of these. 
In its petition for cert, the Government is only seeking ~ 4> 
review of CA9's holding that the claim has not yet been paid for 
purposes of §22. Apparently, the Government is willing to 
concede that if the claim has not paid, there is no common law 
collateral estoppel or res judicata bar to the Danns' defense in 
this trespass action. 
Discussion 
Congressional Action 
Under 25 u.s.c. §1402(b), the Secretary of the Interior must 
submit to Congress a plan for the distribution and use of funds 
awarded in ICC proceedings. Under the version of the statute in 
effect at the time of the ICC judgment in this case, such plans 
had to be submitted within 180 days of the appropriation of the 
funds, although the Secretary could apply for an extension for a 
maximum of 90 days. If no plan was submitted within these time 
limits, the funds could only be distributed pursuant to special 
legislation.l 
In August, 1980, §ongres ~) refused to grant the Secretary an 
extension of time in which to file a plan for the distribution 
and use of the funds at issue in this case. In refusing the 
Secretary's request, Senator Melcher, Chair of the Senate Select 
Committee on Indian Affars, made specific reference to this case 
which was then pending in the DC. Noting that "a significant 
number of Western Shoshone people oppose acceptance of the award 
at this time," Senator Melcher wrote to the Deputy Secretary of 
Indian Affairs: "The outcome of [United States v. Dann] could 
clearly have a strong bearing on the course of action the 
Congress, the Depa frnent and the western Shoshone people might 
wish to pursue." Resp. App. M. He also noted that if Congress 
were to grant an extension, there would be problems satisfying 
the statutory requirement that a plan lie before the appropriate 
congressional committees for 60 working days, since Congress' 
session was due to expire in 40 days. Accordingly, he informed 
the Secretary of the Committee's conclusion that the extension 
should not be granted, and stated that the Secretary should 
submit "appropriate legislation" in due course. 
No such legislation has yet been submitted. 2 The latest 
~-------------------------------------------
1The statute was amended to change the time within which the 
Secretary must submit a plan to one year from the date that funds 
are appropriated, and to allow extensions with congressional 
approval for a maximum of 180 days. 
Footnote(s) 2 will appear on following pages. 
1 
, . . '. 
mention of the case in Congress was a 1982 Senate Report listed 
the ICC's judgment in this case as one requiring special 
legislation. s. Rep. 97-658, 97th Cong., 2d Sess. 3. 
However the Court decides the merits of the question 
presented, Congress will have to leg is late with respect to the -distribution of the funds. It is clear that at least the Senate 
Committee expects Congress to address a number of issues that 
were raised in this case below, but have not been pursued on this 
t 
appeal. ~' whether the Identifiable Group is represen~tive of 
the interests of all of the Western Shoshones. As a result, it 
seems to me that Congress is in a better position than the Court 
to handle this dispute. In its present posture, the Court faces 
only a rather narrow, technical question of statutory 
interpretation. Because it must resolve the problem of 
distribution and use of the funds appropriated for payment of the 
ICC award, Congress necessarily will address the broader 
questions involved in this case. 
Additionally, from what I can discern at this point, I think 
J~ 
the Danns will be done a great injustice if they are prevented ~ 
from raising aboriginal title as a defense to the United States' 
trespass action. The ICC's general determination that aboriginal 
title has been extinguished seems to be contrary to the reality 
of the Danns' continuous occupation. The merits of 
question, however, are not even presented to the Court, 
2under the amendments enacted in 1983, the Secretary should 
have submitted a plan to Congress by January, 1984. 
that I r rYV.5> 
and 
Congress will surely be asked to resolve them. 
The Meaning of "Payment" in the Act 
I think CA9 's conclusion that there has been no "payment" 
within the meaning of §22 of the Indian Claims Commission Act is 
probably correct. As Judge Canby pointed out, there are --"significant legal blocks in the way of delivery" to the Indians: 
no funds can be distributed to them or used for their benefit 
until a plan is approved. While the SG is correct that the 
United States holds the appropriated monies for the Indians, I 
think its role at this point is more analogous to that of a 
stakeholder than that of a trustee. True, the government would 
be accountable to the Indians for this money, but it is not free 
to act as a trustee, for example, by distributing or using the 
funds for the benefit of the Indians. As in the classic 
stakeholder case, until further action is taken (i.e., a plan is 
approved), it is not clear who (i.e., which of the Indians) 
should receive the money or the benefit of it. 
In addition, the statutory bar of §22 is extraordinarily 
farreaching -- payment of any claim discharges the United States 
"of all claims and demands touching any of the matters involved 
in the controversy." Given that the effect of this section goes 
beyond ordinary principles of res judicata, I think it makes 
sense to take a relatively conservative approach to its 
application. 
Finally, I think the SG's claim that CA9's interpretation of 
"payment" is inconsistent with Congress' intent is unpersuasive. 
The SG contends that Congress' purpose in enacting the Indian 
\ .. 
' . 
Claims Commission Act was to relieve itself of the burden of 
resolving the merits of these disputes, and that it is 
inconsistent with this purpose to interpret "payment" under §22 
as requiring congressional approval of a distribution plan. In 
the first place, CA9's interpretation has no effect whatsoever on 
Congress' workload; Congress' role in approving distribution 
plans for ICC awards is one of its own choosing. 
Secondly, the SG misrepresents the burden Congress was 
trying to eliminate. When the Act was passed in 1946, all claims ·-
against the United States growing out of Indian treaties were 
barred from the jurisdiction of the Court of Claims by virtue of 
an 1863 statute. As a result, a special act of Congress was 
required every time Indians wished to bring their claims against 
the United States to the Court of Claims. In passing the Indian 
Claims Commission Act, Congress wanted to rid itself of the 
burden of considering and enacting the special jurisidictional 
acts required to let the Indians press their claims in court. H. 
Rep. 1466, 79th Cong., 1st Sess. (1945), at 2' 6-7. CA9's 
interpretation of §22 is not inconsistent with this goal. 
Moreover, by requiring congressional approval of distribution 
plans for ICC awards, Congress deliberately reserved a role for 
itself in the claims resolution process. CA9's interpretation of 
§22 is fully c with this role. 
Conclusion 
In view of the fact that Congress will have to act in this 
case regardless of what the Court decides, I think your initial 
inclination to DIG the case is a good one. ' The question of 
10. 
Claims Commission Act was to relieve itself of the burden of 
resolving the merits of these disputes, and that it is 
inconsistent with this purpose to interpret "payment" under §22 
as requiring congressional approval of a distribution plan. In 
the first place, CA9's interpretation has no effect whatsoever on 
Congress' workload; Congress' role in approving distribution 
plans for ICC awards is one of its own choosing. 
Secondly, the SG misrepresents the burden Congress was 
trying to eliminate. When the Act was passed in 1946, all claims 
against the United States growing out of Indian treaties were 
barred from the jurisdiction of the Court of Claims by virtue of 
an 1863 statute. As a result, a special act of Congress was 
required every time Indians wished to bring their claims against 
the United States to the Court of Claims. In passing the Indian 
Claims Commission Act, Congress wanted to rid itself of the 
burden of considering and enacting the special jur isidictional 
acts required to let the Indians press their claims in court. H. 
Rep. 1466, 79th Cong., 1st Sess. (1945) , at 2, 6-7. CA9 's 
interpretation of §22 is not inconsistent with this goal. 
Moreover, by requiring congressional approval of distribution 
plans for ICC awards, Congress deliberately reserved a role for 
itself in the claims resolution process. CA9's interpretation of 
§22 is full with this role. 
Conclusion 
In view of the fact that Congress will have to act in this 
case regardless of what the Court decides, I think your initial 
inclination to DIG the case is a good one. · The question of 
11. 
statutory interpretation presented to the Court does not seem to 
be of any general importance. Additionally, there is apparently 
very strong opposition to the ICC award among significant numbers 
of Western Shoshone, a phenomenon of which Congress is aware and 
seems willing to address. 
On the merits, I think CA9's determination that "payment" 
has not yet occurred is probably correct. If the Court decides 
to dec ide the case on the merits, I recommend that you vote to 
affirm. 
~"/~~ 
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CHAMBERS OF" 
JUSTICE WILLIAM H . REHNQUIST 
.iu.vrtmt <!}ltllrl af tlft ~tb .itaftg 
._ulfing~ ~. ~· 2llp'!$ 
January 23, 1985 
Re: 83-1476 - United States v. Dann 
Dear Bill: 
I agree with all of the text of ~r o · ~o-n~~ 
case, and with all of the footnotes~~~pt footnote 
agree with you that there is dicta in John on v. 
and Cherokee Nation v. Georgia that supports e general 
statement that the footnote makes about aboriginal title. 
But the holding in Johnson was that a deed based on Indian 
title could not be recognized in the courts of the United 
States, and Cherokee Nation went off on a jurisdictional 
ground. In both cases whatever the court said was addressed 
to title in an Indian tribe; in this case the Danns are not 
claiming under the rights of the Shoshone Tribe, but as 
individual Indians. I think that your footnote resolves 
several undecided questions if it concludes that the Danns 
have "a right of exclusive occupancy ••• valid against all 
parties until extinguished by the United States." You are 
the author of the opinion, and if you want to have a 
footnote about aboriginal title you are certainly entitled 
to it; I will be happy to join the opinion if you could make 
your observations about this difficult subject somewhat more 
vague and general, or somewhat more precise. 
Sincerel~-
Justice Brennan 
cc: The Conference 
l 
CHA~BERS OF" 
.JUSTICE .JOHN PAUL STEVENS 
.-upuuu Clf&turt &tf tlf~ ~u~ •htt~• 
,ru.fringt&tn, ~. Clf. 20~~~ 
January 23, 1985 
Re: 83-1476 - United States v. Dann 
Dear Bill: 
Please join me. 
Respectfully, 
Justice Brennan 
Copies to the Conference 
CHAMB ER S OF" 
JUSTICE BYRON R. WHITE 
.-~nnt ar01U'i of tift Jmttb ,jtatts-
Jiag~ ~. ar. zn~"~ . 
January 24, 1985 
83-1476 - United States v. Dann 
Dear Bill, 
Please join me. 
Sincerely yours, 
Justice Brennan 
Copies to the Conference 
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SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES 
-z:__? .?7 
UNITED STATES, PETITIONER v. MARY DANN AND 
CARRIE DANN 
ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO -THE UNITED STATES COURT OF 
APPEALS FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT 
[January-, 1985] 
JusTICE BRENNAN delivered the opinion of the Court. 
The question presented in this case is whether the appro-
priation of funds into a treasury account pursuant to 31 
U. S. C. § 724a (Supp. V 1981) 1 constitutes "payment" under 
§22(a) of the Indian Claims Commission Act, 25 U. S. C. 
§ 70u (1976). 2 
I 
This case is an episode in a longstanding conflict between 
the United States and the Shoshone Tribe over title to lands 
'The statute provided: 
There are appropriated, out of any money in the Treasury not otherwise 
appropriated, such sums as may be necessary for the payment, not other-
wise provided for, as certified by the Comptroller General, of final 
judgments, awards, and compromise settlements, which are payable in 
accordance with the terms of ... awards rendered by the Indian Claims 
Commission .... 
2 The statute provided: 
When the report of the Commission determining any claimant to be enti-
tled to recover has been filed with Congress, such report shall have the 
effect of a final judgment of the Court of Claims, and there is authorized to 
be appropriated such sums as are necessary to pay the final determination 
of the Commission. 
The payment of any claim, after its determination in accordance with this 
[Act], shall be a full discharge of the United States of all claims and de-
mands touching any of the matters involved in the controversy. 
83-147~0PINION 
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in the western United States. In 1951 certain members of 
the Shoshone Tribe sought compensation for the loss of ab-
original title 3 to lands located in California, Colorado, Idaho, 
Nevada, Utah, and Wyoming. 4 Eleven years later, the In-
dian Claims Commission entered an interlocutory order hold-
ing that the aboriginal title of the Western Shoshone had 
been extinquished in the latter part of the nineteenth cen-
tury, Shoshone Tribe v. United States, 11 Indian Cl. Comm. 
387, 416 (1962), and later awarded the Western Shoshone in 
excess of $26 million in compensation. Western Shoshone 
Identifiable Group v. United States, 40 Indian Cl. Comm. 318 
(1977). The Court of Claims affirmed this award. 5 Temoak 
Band of Western Shoshone Indians v. United States, 593 F. 
2d 994 (1979): On December 6, 1979, the Clerk of the Court · 
of Claims certified the Commission's award to the General 
Accounting Office. Pursuant to 31 U. S. C. § 724a (Supp. V 
1981), this certification automatically appropriated the 
amount of the award and deposited it for the Tribe in an in-
The Indian Claims Commission was terminated on September 30, 1978 pur-
suant to 25 U. S. C. 70v (1976 ed.). 
3 For a discussion of aboriginal title, see Oneida Indian Nation v. 
County of Oneida, 414 U. S. 661, 667 (1974); Johnson v. Mcintosh, 8 
Wheat. 543, 573-574 (1832); Cherokee Nation v. Georgia, 5 Pet. 1, 17 
(1831); F. Cohen, Handbook of Federal Indian Law 486-493 (1982). On 
the theoretical origins of aboriginal rights, see J. Scott, The Spanish Origin 
of International Law: Francisco de Vitoria and His Law of Nations (1934); 
Cohen, Spanish Origin of Indian Rights, 31 Georgetown L. J. , 1 (1943); 
Cohen, Original Indian Title, 32 Minn. L. Rev. 28 (1947). 
• Section 2 of the Indian Claims Commission Act, 25 U. S. C. § 70a, au-
thorizes claims to be brought on behalf of "any Indian tribe, band, or other 
identifiable group of American Indians" for "claims arising from the taking 
by the United States whether as the result of a treaty of cession or other-
wise, of lands owned or occupied by the claimant without payment for such 
lands of compensation agreed to by the claimant .... " 
5 Section 20(b) of the Indian Claims Commission Act, 25 U.S. C. 
§ 70s(b) (1976), provided for an appeal to the Court of Claims from any 
"final determination" of the Indian Claims Commission. 
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terest bearing trust account in the Treasury of the United 
States. 
Under 25 U. S. C. § 1402(a) 6 and § 1403(a),7 the Secretary 
of the Interior is required, after consulting with the Tribe, to 
submit to Congress within a specified period of time a plan 
for the distribution of the fund. In this case, the Secretary 
has yet to submit a plan of distribution of the $26 million 
owing to the refusal of the Western Shoshone to cooperate in 
devising the plan. The fund apparently has now grown to 
$43 million. Pet. Rep. Brief at 20. 
In 1974, the United States brought an action in trespass 
against two sisters, Mary and Carrie Dann, members of an 
autonomous band 8 of the Western Shoshone, alleging that 
the Danns, in grazing livestock without a permit from the 
United States, were acting in violation of regulations issued 
by the Secretary of the Interior under the authority of the 
6 The statute provides: 
Within one year after appropriation of funds to pay a judgment of the In-
dian Claims Commission . . . , the Secretary of the Interior shall prepare 
and submit to Congress a plan for the use and distribution of the funds. 
7 The statute provides: 
The Secretary shall prepare a plan which shall best serve the interests of 
all those entities and individuals entitled to receive funds of each Indian 
judgment. Prior to the final preparation of the plan, the Secretary shall-
(1) receive and consider any resolution or communication, together with 
any suggested use or distribution plan, which any affected Indian tribe 
may wish to submit to him; and 
(2) hold a hearing of record, after appropriate public notice, to obtain the 
testimony of leaders and members of the Indian tribe which may receive 
any portion, or be affected by the use or distribution, of such funds. . . . 
8 See Steward, The Foundations of Basin-Plateau Shoshonean Society, 
in Languages and Cultures of Western North America 113, 115 (1970) 
(" '[B]and' can have no precise definition. Although it generally signifies 
cohesion and interaction between families that constitute a group of perma-
nent membership, it may range in size from a few families that are closely 
related to many families which include some not related, or it may be struc-
tured on unilineal or bilateral principles, and interaction between the fam-
ilies may take many forms."). 
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Taylor Grazing Act, 43 U. S. C. § 315b. 9 The 5,120 acres at 
issue in the suit are located in the northeast corner of N e-
vada. In response to the United States' suit, the Danns 
claimed that the land has been in the possession of their fam-
ily from time immemorial and that their aboriginal title to the 
land precluded the Government from requiring grazing per-
mits. The United States District Court for the District of 
Nevada rejected the Danns' argument and ruled that aborigi-
nal title had been extinquished by the collateral estoppel 
effect of the Indian Claims Commission's judgment in 1962. 
United States v. Mary and Carry Dann, Civil No. R-74-60 
(1977). The Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reversed 
and remanded, however, on the ground that "[w]hatever may 
have been the implicit assumptions of both the United States 
and the Shoshone Tribes during the litigation . . . , the 
extinquishment question was not necessarily in issue, it was 
not actually litigated and it has not been decided." United 
States v. Dann, 572 F. 2d 222, 225 (CA9 1978). 
On remand, the District Court held that aboriginal title t 
was exti129uished when the final award of the Indian Claims 
Comnnss10~ertified ~on December 6, 1979. 
Civil No. R-74-60 (1980). On appeal, the Government de-
fended the judgment of the District Court on the ground that 
the "full discharge" language of § 22(a) of the Indian Claims 
Commission Act, see n. 2, supra, precluded the Danns from 
raising the defense of aboriginal title. Although Congress 
had not yet approved a plan for the distribution of the funds 
to the Western Shoshone, the United States maintained that 
the requirement of "payment" under § 22(a) was satisfied by 
9 The statute provides: 
The Secretary of the Interior is authorized to issue or cause to be issued 
permits to graze livestock on such grazing districts to such bona fide set-
tlers, residents, and other stock owners as under his rules and regulations 
are entitled to participate in the use of the range, upon the payment annu-
ally of reasonable fees in each case to be fixed or determined from time to 
time in accordance with governing law. 
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the Congressional appropriation of the $26 million award into 
the Treasury account. The Danns argued that until Con-
gress approved a plan for the distribution of the money to the 
Tribe, "payment" was not satisfied. 
The Court of Appeals held that "payment" had J!2t oc- ( fll 
curred within the meaning of § 22(a) and reversed the DTstrict · n 
Court. United States v. Dann, 706 F. 2d 919, 926 (CA9 
1983). The Court reasoned that until a plan of distribution 
was adopted by the Congress, there remained "significant 
legal blocks in the way of delivery to the payee," and thus 
the "ordinary meaning" of payment was not satisfied. We 
granted certiorari to resolve the question of whether the 
certification of the award and appropriation under § 724a con-
stitutes payment nder § 22(a). 467 U. S. - (1984). ~e 
II 
The legislative purposes of the Indian Claims Commission 
Act and the principles of payment under the common law of 
trust as they have been applied to the context of relations be-
tween native American co the United States 
require at we hold th "paYJ!lent" occurs nder § 22(a) 
Wlienfunds are placed by the United States into an account in 
the Treasury of the United States for the Tribe pursuant to 
31 U. S. C. § 724a (Supp. V 1981). 
A 
The Indian Claims Commission Act had two purposes. 
The "chief purpose of the [Act was] to dispose of the Indian 
claims problem with finality." H. R. Rep. 1466, 79th Cong., 
1st Sess. 10 (1945). This purpose was effected by the lan-
guage of § 22(a): "When the report of the Commission deter-
mining any claimant to be entitled to recover has been filed 
with Congress, such report shall have the effect of a final 
judgment of the Court of Claims. . .. " 10 Section 22(a) also 
10 On the finality of judgments of the Court of Claims, see 28 U. S. C. 
§ 2519 ("A final judgment of the United States Claims Court against any 
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states that the "payment of any claim . . . shall be a full dis-
charge of the United States of all claims and demands touch-
ing any of the matters involved in the controversy." To 
hold, as the court below has, that payment does not occur 
until a final plan of distribution has been approved by Con-
gress would frustrate the purpose of finality by postponing 
the preclusive effects of § 22(a) while subjecting the United 
States to continued liability for claims and demands that 
"touch" the matter previously litigated and resolved by the 
Indian Claims Commission. 
The second purpose of the Indian Claims Commission Act 
was to transfer from Congress to the Indian Claims Commis-
sion the responsibility for determining the merits of native 
American claims. In the course of hearings on the creation 
of the Indian Claims Commission, Congressman Henry Jack-
son, Chairman of the House Committee on Indian Affairs, 
made this clear: 
[T]he very purpose of this act, the reason we are com-
ing to Congress, is that we are being harassed constantly 
by various individual pieces of legislation. I do not want 
to act on seperate legislation and Congress is being told 
to act on those bills, without knowing the facts, and the 
purpose of this legislation will be to dispose of all those 
routine claims and let the commission decide what the 
obligation is of this Government to the Indians; and, act-
ing upon those findings made by the Commission, Con-
gress will appropriate the money. House Hearings on 
H. R. 1198 and H. R. 1341, 79th Cong., 1st Sess., 68 
(1945). 
During the floor debate on the Act, Congressman Jackson ob-
served that the House was acting in response to a study by 
the Brookings Institution that had concluded that "there 
plaintiff shall forever bar any further claim, suit, or demand against the 
United States arising out of the matters involved in the case or contro-
versy."); United States v. O'Grady, 89 U. S. 641, 647 (1875); W. Cowen, 
et al., The United States Court of Claims, Part II, 22-25 (1978). 
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ought to be a prompt and final settlement of all claims be-
tween the Government and its Indian citizens, and the best 
way to accomplish this purpose is to set up temporarily an 
Indian Claims Commission which will sift all these claims, 
subject to appropriate judicial review, and bring them to a 
conclusion once and for all." 92 Gong. Rec. 5312 (1946). 
Prior to the adoption of the Indian Claims Commission Act 
by the House of Representatives, Attorney General Clark is-
sued the following warning: 
The bill would provide that when the report of the 
Commission determining any claimant to be entitled to 
recover has been filed with Congress, such report would 
have the effect of a final judgment to be paid in like man-
ner as are judgments of the Court of Claims. This pro-
vision would make the Commission virtually a court with 
the power to determine claims based both upon legal and 
moral grounds rather than a fact finding body as an aid 
to Congress. In view of the vague basis upon which 
many of the claims presented to the Commission would 
be predicated, and the extremely novel character of the 
functions delegated to the Commission, the question is 
raised of whether or not the recognition of the claims 
should not rest finally with Congress. The provision 
making the findings of the Commission binding upon 
Congress would constitute a surrender by Congress of 
its very necessary prerogative to sift and control this 
unusual type of claim. 92 Gong. Rec. 5311 (1946) (letter 
to Congressman John Cochran in response to his request 
for the Attorney General's "views with respect to the 
bill (H. R. 4497) to create a Indian Claims Commission." 
Ibid.) 
Despite this warning, the House left the language of the Act 
unchanged. The Senate, however, deleted from the House 
bill the language that Attorney General Clark asserted would 
give the decisions of the Indian Claims Commission the effect 
of a final judgment binding upon Congress. The Conference 
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adopted the House version "in order to make perfectly clear 
the intention of both houses that the determinations of the 
Commission should, unless reversed [by the Court of 
Claims], have the same finality as judgments of the Court of 
Claims." H. R. Rep. 2693, 79th Cong., 2nd Sess. 8 (1946). 
As enacted, the Indian Claims Commission Act explicitly in-
corporates this standard of finality in § 22(a). 
The court below justified its decision on the ground that in 
making "payment" turn on the submission and approval of a 
final plan of distribution, Congress would have one last 
opportunity to review the merits of claims litigated before 
the Indian Claims Commission. 706 F. 2d, at 927. This jus-
tification for delay obviously conflicts with the purpose of re-
lieving Congress of the burden of having to resolve these 
claims. 
B 
Aside from its departure from the purposes of the Indian 
Claims Commission Act, the Court of Appeals' interpretation 
is in conflict with the accepted legal uses of the word "pay-
ment"-uses we assume Congress intended to adopt when it 
enacted § 22(a). To accept the argument of the Court of Ap-
peals would give the word "payment" a meaning that differs 
markedly from its common law meaning, which has long been 
applied by this Court to the relations between native Ameri-
can tribes and the United States. 
The common law recognizes that payment may be satisfied 
despite the absence of actual possession of the funds by the 
creditor. Funds transferred from a debtor to an agent or 
trustee of the creditor constitute payment, and it is of no con-
sequence that the creditor refuses to accept the funds from 
the agent or the agent misappropriates the funds. 11 The ra-
11 See G. Bogert, The Law of Trusts and Trustees § 902 (2d rev. ed. 
1982) (" . . . it is now universally the law that the purchaser of trust prop-
erty from the trustee ... may pay the purchase money to the trustee with-
out making any inquiry as to the use to which the trustee intends to put the 
money. The purchaser, in the absence of notice to the contrary, may 
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tionale for this is that fiduciary obligations and the rules of 
agency so bind the trustee or agent to the creditor (i. e., the 
beneficiary or principal) as to confer effective control of the 
funds upon the creditor. 
The Court has applied these principles to relations between 
native American communities and the United States. In 
Seminole Nation v. United States, 316 U. S. 286 (1942), the 
United States was obligated by treaty to pay annual an-
nuities to members of the Seminole Nation. Instead, the 
Government transferred the money to the Seminole General 
Council. Members of the Tribe argued that because the 
Seminole General Council had misappropriated the money, 
the Government had not satisfied its obligation to pay the in-
dividual members of the tribe. In disposing of the case, the 
Court relied upon the rule that "a third party who pays 
money to a fiduciary for the benefit of the beneficiary, with 
knowledge that the fiduciary intends to misappropriate the 
money or otherwise be false to his trust, is a participant in 
the breach of trust and liable therfor to the beneficiary." 
I d., at 296. The Court's holding was based on its recognition 
of the traditional rule that a debtor's payment to a fiduciary 
of the creditor satisfies the debt. 12 Absent actual knowledge 
safely assume that the price will be applied in an appropriate manner as 
trust property."); (A. Scott, The Law of Trusts§ 321 (3rd ed. 1967); Stone, 
Some Legal Problems Involved in the Transmission of Funds, 21 Columbia 
Law Review 507, 507 (1921). See also, the Uniform Trustees' Powers 
Act, § 2 ("A person who in good faith pays or transfers to a fiduciary any 
money as such is authorized to receive, is not responsible for the proper 
application therof by the fiduciary; and any right or title acquired from the 
fiduciary in consideration of such payment or transfer is not invalid in con-
sequence of a misapplication by the fiduciary."). 
12 The Court's acknowledgement of this general rule is apparent from its 
citation to G. Bogert, The Law of Trusts and Trustees § 901 (1935), which 
stated: "It is now the law that the purchase of trust property from the 
trustee, where the trustee has a power to sell and has properly executed 
his power, may pay the purchase money to the trustee without making any 
inquiry as to the use of to which the trustee intends to put the money. 
The purchaser may safely assume that the price will be applied in an appro-
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of the fraudulent intent of the trustee-or some other recog-
nized exception to the general rule-the Government's pay-
ment to the Council would have discharged its treaty obliga-
tions. Ibid. The order remanding the case for purposes of 
determining whether the Government had fraudulent intent, 
id., at 300, would have made sense only if the Court believed 
that, absent such knowledge, the Government's treaty ob-
ligations were discharged. 
The Court's reliance on the general rule in Seminole Na-
tion is authority for our holding that the United States has 
made "payment" under § 22a. The final award of the Indian 
Claims Commission placed the Government in a dual role 
with respect to the Tribe: the Government was at once a 
judgment debtor, owing $26 million to the Tribe, and a 
trustee for the Tribe responsible for ensuring that the money 
was put to productive use and ultimately distributed in a 
manner consistent with the best interests of the Tribe. 13 In 
short, the Indian Claims Commission ordered the Govern-
ment qua judgment debtor to pay $26 million to the Govern-
ment qua trustee for the Tribe as the beneficiary. Once the 
money was deposited into the trust account, payment was 
effected. 
III 
The Danns also claim to possess individual as well as tribal 
aboriginal rights and that because only the latter were before 
priate manner as trust property, unless special circumstances come to his 
notice indicating the opposite." 
18 In suggesting that significant obstacles to the distribution of the 
money remain despite the transfer of the fund into a trust account, the 
Court of Appeals failed to recognize the legal strictures ensuring that the 
money will be applied to the benefit of the Tribe. We have, for example, 
held that the United States, as a fiduciary, is obligated to make the funds 
productive and is fully accountable if those funds are converted or mis-
managed. See e. g., United States v. Mitchell, 463 U. S. 206, 226 (1983); 
United States v. Sioux Nation, 448 U. S. 371, 408-409 (1980); United 
States v. Shoshone Tribe, 304 U. S. 111, 115-116 (1938); Shoshone Tribe v. 
United States, 299 U. S. 476, 497 (1937). 
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the Indian Claims Commission, the "final discharge" of § 22a 
does not bar the Danns from raising individual aboriginal title 
as a defense in this action. Though we have recognized that 
individual aboriginal rights may exist in certain contexts, 14 
this contention has not been addressed by the lower courts 
and, if open, should :first be addressed below. We express 
no opinion as to its merits. ~
Th~Er":l'l.finth Circuit is reversed, and the 
case is remanded for proceedings consistent with this 
opinion. 
14 Cramer v. United States, 261 U. S. 219, 227 (1923); United States v. 
Santa Fe Pacific Railroad Company, 314 U. S. 339, 375-358 (1941); see 
generally Cohen, Original Indian Title, 32 Minn. L. Rev. 28, 53-54 (1947). 
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